Institutional Arrangement In Rural Urban Migration: A Case Study Of Migration To The Brick Kiln

Ananda Meher

Abstract-
Studies on migration mostly focus on the either distress nature or the worker vulnerable condition at the destination place. This study look the institutional arrangements of brick kiln migration process, as the brick kiln migration from western Odisha have been continuing over four decades without any crisis. On this background, this study look the interconnection of the political, social and economic institution of the worker in their origin place with the migration process through the active participation of labour contractor (Sardar and second Sardar). The main objective of this study is to scrutinize the institutional arrangement (role and function of the Sardar and second Sardar) to expand and sustain the brick kiln migration. To scrutinize the objective, this study closely investigate the stage wise operation of the labour contractor (Sardar and second Sardar) with the help of quantitative and qualitative data collected through primary primary survey of second Sardar. And also this study demonstrates the objective on the basis of primary survey of brick kiln migrant worker from four villages of Balangir District of Odisha. For the empirical analysis, this paper used basic statistics only. The present study have explained the second Sardar role in maintaining the social, political and economic conflict in their worker origin place. In social and political perspective, it has showed the functionality of village committee as a religious and political institution to help the sardar in migration process. It has also explained interlinkages between the worker origin place economic structure and destination wage rate decision through the second Sardar involvement. In this economical factor, it has emphasized the relationship between the worker debt amount and advance payment.

Key Word- Advance Payment, Sardar, Second Sardar, Brick Kiln, Institutional Arrangement, Economic Structure, Migration Process, village committee

Introduction-
In the context of understanding the agrarian relation and rural-urban migration, specifically the cyclical migration has got keen importance in the contemporary period. The unfree agrarian relation prolong through interlink market structure in the rural economy. Some of the new classical development economist have been arguing that migration to urban nonfarm sector is a solution to the unfree agrarian relation. But (Breman, 1985, 1989, 1993; Brass 1986, 1990) argued that migration is not a solution to the rural problem due to the distress nature of the rural-urban migration and unfree labour relation at the urban informal sector also. This study elucidates the interconnection between the rural economic structure and seasonal migration through second Sardar involvement. To scrutinize the interconnection process, this study closely investigates the process of migration and stage wise operation of the labour contractor.

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This paper has emphasized on instructional arrangement of brick kiln migrant worker from western Odisha. In institutional arrangement, it mostly focus on the function of second Sardar. There are very few work touching the institutional arrangement part of migration and even those are explain about the arrangement system are not very inside. The debate between Jadkha, Breman and Brass give more emphasis to the mode of production debate and also interlocking of product, labour and credit market in village economy. Breman (1990, 1993) traces the institutional management part in the case of inter and intra state labour migration to the agriculture.

To understand the institutional arrangement, this paper have worked on the case study of brick kiln migration. Migration from western Odisha, most specific to KBK\(^2\) district of Odisha to the brick kiln side of Telengana, Andhara Pradesh and Tamil Nadu is not an emerging phenomenon rather it is continuing over last four decades. Government (both center and state) spend around 6251 cr. for the development of KBK region of Odisha in between 1998-99 to 2007 and the expenditure is also continuing. But still large number of distress migration (most specific to brick kiln industry) is ongoing. It clearly shows the failure of government scheme in implementation level. This paper try to answer, why won’t be any crisis to the migration process? Why is there no any competition among the owner and Sardar in recruitment of labourer, result in the betterment of the migrant worker? Thirdly, as there is huge migration have taken place, why won’t be any social, political and economic conflict in the worker origin place? 

**Objective**—On this background this paper mostly has one broad objective as, what are the institutional arrangements created by the brick kiln owner to expand and sustain the brick kiln migration for last four decades? How is it functioning?

**Sample Design and Sample technique**

To substantiate the above objective, primary as well as secondary source of information are used in this paper. For the primary survey, one district of Western Odisha is selected due to lack of time and resources. Secondly we visited so many brick kiln sides, during the minimum wage awareness camp\(^3\). Before conducting survey, I had collected information about the number of households and population size of each survey village from the census (2011) source. But main objective of the study is to target the migrating households and their other related institutions, whose data are not available from any secondary source and it is also more time and money consuming to survey the whole village within the time limit. In the first stage, the data pertaining to all the migrant households has been collected through structure questionnaire method.

From the secondary literature that exists it is evident that a large proportion of the brick kiln migrants are constituted by STs and SCs. Further, it is also pointed out by existing research that the largest proportion of the brick kiln migrant worker streams are constituted predominantly by landless labour, small and marginal farmers (see Sengupta and Vijay 2015). A small section of medium farmers also are part of the brick kiln migration process. It is therefore that the total sample of 63 households have chosen through stratified random sampling method from four

\(^2\) KBK includes eight district of Odisha as Balangir, Subarna pure, Kalahandi, Nuapada, Koraput, Nabarang Pure, Raigada and Malkangiri. These district are most backward district of not only Odisha but also India.

\(^3\) I attend three awareness camp (Dundegal, Tukuguda, and Jinnaram of Telangana state) during the period of January 2014 to June 2014.
village of Balangir district. Apart from the survey conducted for the migrant households, this study also gathered information from 5 second Sardar.

To address the above stated objectives, the study mostly used simple statistics such as averages, percentages etc. To show the impact of institutional arrangement, emergency of money and brick kiln experience of the labourer over their advance payment decision, this paper has used simple regression method. This study has gathered both quantitative as well as qualitative information from the survey to understand the social, economic and political relation in brick kiln migration process.

**Geographical location of the survey village**

Before rushing to the second Sardar, it has important to understand the basic features of the study area. Balangir district is one of the most backward districts not only of Odisha, but also India. It is situated in the Western part of Odisha, and two small rivers as Sukhtel and Anga, going through it. It has 206 National Highway and train connection from Vishakhapatnam – Sambalpur route in one part and Raipur- Titilagarh route in another part. My survey villages have district road connection and railway network within 12 k.m. -15 k.m. distance. For Ghusuramunda and Brabandh villages 5 k.m. and 12 k.m. distance from Muribahal Block office respectively, which is also a railway station (from where they used railway service to migrate). For Malpada and Sahaj Pani Villages are situated 24 k.m. distance from Kharakhol block office and 6 k.m. distance from Lathor railway station. Except Barbandh, natural environment of all three villages are same, the village district road is going on one side and the other side is mostly covered by forest and hill. The Barbandh village is in the Dumerbahal Forest Range with Panchayat road connection.

**Demography and social indicators of the survey village**

Population size of Bolagir district is around 16 lakh, which is also 4% of state (Odisha) population. Most of the social indicators as sex ratio, literacy rate, and proportion of SC and ST population of both Odisha and Balangir are very similar. In agricultural land pattern, about 40% of land are net sown area, but only 15% are irrigated which is much less than the state level irrigated area percentage of 28%. About a quarter of land is covered by forest area, so it is providing a lot of forest products to forest dwellers starting from, Mahuwa, Char, Mango, other consuming fruit and also some type of meats which address the Adivasi peoples’ consumption demand. The population size of my four survey villages ranges from 800 to 1400. Villages of this size constitute 47% of all the villages for the all India level statistics, such villages are however 42% of all the villages in Odisha, and 61% of all the villages in Balangir district. In all of my survey village, about more than 60% of the population are from the SC and ST category.

**Primary survey**

The study have surveyed 60 numbers the labour households, those are migrating to the brick kiln side. The following table gives broader understanding of the survey and labourer households. The survey households have scattered over regular as well as irregular migrant households. About more than 33% of the households have been migrating every year and about 30% households migrated 3 or less than 3 years in last 10 years.

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4 All population data are collected from the CENSUS source and irrigation figure are from
Table-1: year of migration and its relation to other variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year group</th>
<th>no of households (%)</th>
<th>age of HH head</th>
<th>female/male ratio</th>
<th>SC Caste group (%)</th>
<th>ST Caste group (%)</th>
<th>OBC Caste group (%)</th>
<th>land holding</th>
<th>no. land less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>20 (33%)</td>
<td>41.05</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>7 (41%)</td>
<td>9 (35%)</td>
<td>4 (24%)</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>11 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-8</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
<td>39.40</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-6</td>
<td>7 (11%)</td>
<td>37.00</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-4</td>
<td>10 (17%)</td>
<td>43.80</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>3 (18%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
<td>5 (30%)</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18 (31%)</td>
<td>38.06</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>5 (29%)</td>
<td>8 (31%)</td>
<td>5 (30%)</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>8 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60 (100%)</td>
<td>39.50</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>17 (100%)</td>
<td>26 (100%)</td>
<td>17 (100%)</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>32 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data source- primary survey of the Author (in 2014)*

There is no more difference between the age of households head and lack of any signifying trend relation with the year of migration. The gender variable has also no any substantial role in explaining the years of migration. But the caste is one of the important factors in elucidating year of migration. More percentage of SC, ST are regular migrant, around 50% of the SC households have been migrating regularly. In OBC, around 60% are migrating 5 or less than 5 years. This is because of the migration process started by the SC households and the ST joined with them in post 1990 the OBC households entered into the brick kiln migration process, it is clear in history of migration section. Same picture is also showing in landless households, more percentage of landless household are regular migrant. But the land holding scattering do not have any relation with the year of migration.

**History of migration**

Migration mostly had started in post-independence era to the Vail steel plant as construction as well brick kiln labourer. Migration to the brick kiln of Andhra Pradesh (near Vishakhapatnam) had started at 1965, in the period of drought and acute food shortage. The continue demand for brick with the enhancement of construction sector created an institutional system (stage wise Sardar) to supply brick kiln labour. This demand of labour have given opportunity to the Dalit to sustain their live and employment and feeling some freedom from caste operation. There is a clear link between the untouchability and brick kiln work, all brick kiln are situated far distance from the village and the labourer are staying inside the brick kiln, no any link between the brick kiln owner house and brick kiln side. The marginal and landless farmer were bind with village elites in Halia system. After the weakening of Halia system (from 1980 onwards) they follow the path of migration. Medium and some big farmer had started migrating late 1990’s and early 2000. And it also has given opportunity to some of the first time migrant to evolve as big Sardar with huge income generation source. For the people of my survey area, migration to brick kiln is an option to repay their loan for the farmer in draught year and for the agricultural labourer in most of the year.
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**Structure of migration**-
To enhance and sustain the migration over generation the Sardar and owner have created an institutional system. The institutional structure is mostly the stage wise Sardar and mafia group working in between the owner and labourer. Each group have role in generating surplus through decreasing risk and uncertainty of labour supply. Let’s start from the owner, most of the owner are situated nearest city of other state, on the other hand labourer are located far distance rural village. The labourer would require lump sum money to repay debt and for special consumption expenditure. So, the owner are giving loan or advance money to the labourer for the repayment of their old loan and force them migrate for a period of seven month. How do the owner trust and know the labourer interest of migration? So, the owner has created institutional system and the stage wise Sardar and Mafia group are important part of this institution. The owner has employed a Sardar on his confidence and trust to mediate between the labourer and owner. To meet the increasing demand of labourer, the Sardar are employing some second Sardar under him. So this second sardar work is to make the migration process widespread, sustain over time at constant advance payment (wage rate). In between the train journey from the labourer home town to destination (brick kiln nearest train station), Mafia group have been working to assure the Sardar and owner that the labourer are unable to get out. To understand the middle man or labour contractor institutional system, it is necessary to investigate each group role and functionalities in the process of migration.

Except these mafia groups, the second Sardar and Sarda are maintaining the social, economic and political conflict arises due to the migration process. In socially, the second Sardar have suppressed social conflict through payment to the village committee at the time of religious festival of the village. In economically, the second Sardar help the village elites to extend his moneylending business. Details about the second Sardar and handling the conflict of interest is stated in following section.

**Tree diagram of a survey village**-
This tree diagram is mostly based on one of my village survey information and also from census 2011 data of that village. This diagram is trying to simplify the whole migrant village structure and interlinkage between Sardar and the labourer. In Malpada village, 137 numbers of

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5 To simplify the bigger complex picture of stage wise Sardar and their functionalities, I try to minimize them I two stage level.
households with 995 total population are staying, out of them 155 are total working population\(^6\). We divide whole village into two groups as migrant and non-migrant households. Non-migrant are the households who must have some regular employment over the year as, govt. job holder, private job in local town, yearly informal job opportunity, shopkeeper, big farmer. Rest the labourer, marginal and small farmer are coming under migrant category, among the migrant some are regularly migrating and other are migrating irregularly (migrating in gap period). In the survey village averagely 35-40 pathri (one pathri constitute three working member) are migrating.

After labourer, the second Sardar is directly linked with migration process from the village of labourer. There are around 3 second Sardar are working in the study village who are evolve from labourer group, out of them one is from OBC (Gauda or Yadav caste) and rest two are from SC (Dalit caste). Out of these three second Sardar, two second Sardar (one -OBC, and one -SC) are working under one big sardar and another second Sardar have been working under other big Sardar. Each second sardar are mobilizing their respective caste group labourer. So they easily control the labourer and abolish the competition for higher advance payment.

Table-2: tree diagram of a survey village.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village (Malpada) total households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Non-migrant households | Migrant households  \\
| Regular migrant households | Irregular migrant households |
| Average migrant family – 40-50 (information from village committee) |
| 3- second Sardar |
| 2- big Sardar |

**Characteristics of Second Sardar**

Who will be the second Sardar, how and who decides it? To answer these questions it is necessary to understand the features of second Sardar. While class based analysis usually analyses in terms of polarities and conflict of interests, a second sardar presents a peculiar agent who has to present two opposite objectives beings fulfilled by one person. He will be a person who facilitates the exploiter to exploit labourers while simultaneously second sardars are people who are personally helpful and provide care to labour during contingencies. An investigation into such a complex agency therefore will be very interesting.

**General-** The economic and social position of the second Sardar is not much different from the brick kiln migrant labour household’s conditions. They usually start their journey from being brick kiln labourer themselves, gradually some labour become a second Sardar and at the last stage they could evolve into being a big Sardar. The average size of the second Sardar family is 4 members. The second Sardars are not highly qualified person, their average years of schooling

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\(^6\) Census (2011)  
\(^7\) Big farmer are mostly from Dalit (engage only in cultivation) migrating in harvest damaged period.
are just around 4 years. Two second Sardars are also illiterate; even some big Sardars are too. But all of them know Telugu language, due to regular interaction with the owner in destination place. In social status, all the second Sardars, whom I interviewed, are from SC and ST category; most of the big Sardars are also from SC category. It is due to their past experience, before 1990, only SC and some ST households were migrating to brick kiln work.

**Income source**-The second Sardars have three sources of income as in the source area. They have income from agriculture, forest product and from the brick kiln side. The average size of landholding of second Sardar is about 1.5 acres and 80 percent of them purchase after becoming a second Sardar. So, the Second Sardars are from marginal landholding households and most of them cultivate for their own consumption purpose. In forest product, average Mahuli collection is about 80 Kg and Char collection is 47 kg per second Sardar households. The second Sardars get a better price (as for Mahuli- 22 and char- 42 rupees per KG) for forest product than the labour households.

**Consumption pattern**- Average consumption expenditure is around 6880 rupees out of which 50 percent on food expenditure and rest 50 percent on non-food consumption expenditure. In food expenditure, alcohol expenditure contributes around 16 percent (800 rupees averagely) share. This high alcohol expenditure is due to their more social connection among the labour households group. In non-food expenditure, cloth and health comprise 25 percent and 35 percent share respectively. 60 percent out of them are used in private hospital. The transportation cost contributes around 12 percent share of their non-food expenditure. This high transportation cost because of their help to the labour households in their needy time in his bike and regular connection with different village labour groups.

**Smartness**- If the second Sardar is young, he moves all over the local area and creates big friends’ circle. If the second Sardar is little old, he would find his goodwill through his role as a responsible person helping the labour households. The second Sardar also has to possess the quality of being at ease while conversing with strangers, a rare quality for closed societies that have limited interaction with the outside world. The second sardar must have the ability to negotiate and strike contracts with strangers. Because of these qualities the second sardar acts as the liaison between the labour household and the big sardar.

**Experience as a labourer**- As already mentioned, all the second Sardars start their careers as brick kiln labour. On an average, much before a labourer is elevated to the position of a second Sardar, he would have 5 years of experience as a brick kiln worker. The actual number of years of experience for this elevation depends on how quickly the labourer picks up and exhibits the above mentioned qualities. They learn skills of labour recruitment from their second Sardars who recruit them into the brick kiln labour market. First, they act as assistants helping to recruit

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8 In past as well as in current period also, people mind setup in Odisha that the brick work relates to SC households work. If we ask any brick kiln worker about their caste, they first say, they are not from the untouchable caste.

9 Whenever I started my field survey, the first person whom I interact is second Sardar because they are more openly accessible unlike the usual approach of being a little suspicious and reserved in rural economies that are closed having a small radius of interactions..
5-10 Patharis for their second Sardar. After two-three years of such help to their second Sardar, when he will able to mobilize 20-25 households, he directly contacts their Sardar to work as second Sardar for recruitment of labourers. For this transformation, he needs to work under one Sardar to gain the confidence. First, the second Sardar will work honestly with respect to the disbursement of funds provided and secondly the households mobilized by this person as brick kiln workers must be hard working and should not run away in the middle of the contract period. 

Experience as second Sardar- After becoming a second Sardar, he needs to sustain his position for some years, up to the period he will be a Sardar. The experience of second Sardar in this survey is around 6 years. Out of 5 second Sardar respondents, 2 were on their way to becoming full-fledged Sardars from 2015 onwards. The most important quality required to become a Sardar is to gain the trust of the owner. This confidence of the owner can easily be constructed through the reference of any other big Sardar. The owner usually takes interest to appoint new Sardar because they take less commission and secondly, they supply labourer without license. To become a Sardar, the person should have the capacity to recruit at least 200 labourers, so they need a link with more labourers. To increase the number of labourers, the second Sardar teaches techniques of negotiation and recruitment to some of the workers who he recruits to enhance the supply labourers to him.

Role of the second Sardars in the process of migration

The social networking activity of the second Sardars begins soon after the end of one season of brick kiln work. In this sense to merely analyses the second sardar as a recruiting agency in terms of his functionality is to miss the whole process which makes this edifice of a recruiter sustainable across different production periods. The second sardar for instance manages the loan amount for the labourers and helps the labour households in different official activities etc. He connects with the people to know their interest about migration in next season and tries to increase his catchment of labour. Second stage of work is to pursue households to migrate in the coming season. So, he encourages labourers to receive the first instalment of advance payment to spend on Nuakhai festival. The Sardar called this payment at Nuakhai festival as first instalment of advance payment. In my survey, about 97 percent of households are taking Nuakhai festival expenditure as their first instalment of advance payment.

After taking first instalment, the households are inducted into an informal contract with the second Sardar. The second Sardar maintains regular touch with the labourers and helps to get loan from other sources in case of contingencies. This regular touch has two ideas behind it, firstly to monitor the workers households’ whereabouts so that they do not cheat, after having borrowed the first installment and secondly, to gauge the level of exigency with which labour household need money, which help him gain an edge in the bargaining power so as to reduce the advance amount as a trade-off with timely access to money.

Relation with village elites- The second Sardars also work as a mediator between the village moneylender and labourers. One way he is helping the labourers to get loan in his emergency time and on the other hand he is also helping the moneylender to extend his moneylending business. Most of the time, he guarantees for the repayment of loan of the labourers. He can force the labourers to repay the loan after receiving advance payment on which he acts as guarantor. So, the defaulter percentage is also reduced for the village moneylender. For this
intermediation, he gets access to generous amounts of loan on demand and sometimes even at a lower than usual interest rate.

**Borrower and lender’s relation in informal credit market and purpose of loan:-**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land holding group</th>
<th>Causes of debt</th>
<th>Linkage between lender and borrower</th>
<th>% of HH helped by second Sardar to get loan</th>
<th>Debt amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land less</td>
<td>Health- (25%)</td>
<td>Labour market- (73%) SARDAR- (13%)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>13586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consumption- (38%)</td>
<td>SARDAR- product market- (4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ceremony &amp; gift - (22%)</td>
<td>Other - (10%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Input - (4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>Health- (22%)</td>
<td>Labour market- (42%) SARDAR- (37%)</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>17474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consumption- (35%)</td>
<td>SARDAR- product market- (16%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ceremony &amp; gift - (25%)</td>
<td>Other - (5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Input - (10%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF &amp; MDF</td>
<td>Health- (36%)</td>
<td>SARDAR- (20%) Product Market- (80%)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>24000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ceremony &amp; gift - (18%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Input - (45%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>Health- (30%)</td>
<td>Labour market- (52%) SARDAR- (22%)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>17365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consumption- (29%)</td>
<td>SARDAR- product market- (15%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ceremony &amp; gift - (25%)</td>
<td>Other - (3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Input - (12%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source- Author’s primary survey, 2014.

In interlinkage relationship between the lender and the borrower, more than 50% households are controlled by labour market. It is also more among the landless households than other group of landholder. Brick kiln Sardar is also controlling good part of migrant households (22%) through credit market linkage. But about 70% of borrowing households are able to access informal loan through the help of their second Sardar.

If we look their purpose of loan, about 88% of the households have taken loan for ‘unproductive’ purpose and only 12% have taken loan for the investment in agriculture. Out of unproductive loan, it is distributed among health, consumption, gifts and ceremony expenditure very symmetrically. This expenditure on unproductive purposes decreases with increasing landholding. Within the unproductive expenditure loan, about 36% of loan goes to consumption expenditure of food, cloth, footwear, and festival/ceremonies expenditure among the landless and marginal farmer but the small and medium farmer does not have this loan.

The *decision about the advance payment* depends upon the requirement and bargaining power of the households. Two forces work to decline the advance amount as interlinked market structure, firstly, the awareness of the second sardar about the exigent condition of the household with reference to the requirement of money by the household and secondly, by way of using the high advance amounts treated as credit payments to indefinitely extend the timescale of employment thus threatening to gain a right to forced labour. In most cases, interlinked process help the second Sardar to decrease the advance payment, but in some special cases, the Sardars threaten forced work to avoid the high advance amounts demanded by the labour households. Typically the second Sardar always avoids those labour households who demand higher advance payment. Just after the payment of total advance amount to the labourers, the Sardar pays some festival fees (Dana) to the village committee through second Sardar. This is one type of *negotiation with*
the village committee, a tacit agreement that the village committee would enforce the informal contract between the sardar and the labour households. In some cases, the second Sardar gives assurance to pay the amount at the time of festival also. These payments have two major benefits, firstly, the village authorities permit illegal migration from their village. Secondly, the village committee would treat any workers running away from the brick kiln in the middle of the contract period as cheater and therefore as a crime, and also they help the second Sardar to collect the advance amount from the ‘cheater’. This payment to the village committee is mostly 100 rupees per worker recruited from the concerned village. This payment to the village committee by the second sardar is also mention in (Sengupta and Vijay, 2015) survey report.

Another responsibility of the second Sardar is to take permission from the local police for illegal migration just after payment of advance amount. Before two-three days of migration, the second Sardar negotiates with the police to permit him for illegal migration. The police take two hundred rupees per person to allow the labourers to migrate illegally. The police responsibility is to protect the Sardar and second Sardar if any case arises against them. Secondly, this also creates a condition wherein complaints about illegal migration from civil society or political groups get ignored\textsuperscript{10}.

*Relation with local politicians* - He always plays an important role in local Panchayat election. In Panchayat election, 1000 votes is enough to own a Sarpanch position. The second Sardars can mobilize his migrant households to vote (35 family means, around 120 voters, and if we includes their other family member, it never be less than 200 voters). As he plays the role of providing block votes in the election, the political representatives aspiring for the Sarpanch post always respect him and his word. The influence of the second sardar on local politics can be gauged from the fact that in some instances, the second Sardar is chosen as a contestant in local elections. All my interviewed second Sardars have good relation with local Sarpanch and other Panchayat member. Even some government licensed Sardars are currently functioning as Sarpanchs of some villages.

If the second Sardar receives advance payment for Makardam work, then he will migrate with the labourer and control the whole labourer group during the travel. Otherwise, the Sardar sends one Makardam with the migrant labourers to control and provide information about the worker at the place of destination. About 80 percent of my second Sardars are also migrating with the labourer as Makardam. On the day of migration, the second Sardar-cum Makardam takes the labourers to the railway station trough a lorry (truck) service\textsuperscript{11}. He also books the railway ticket for each labourer.

\textsuperscript{10} I am following, brick kiln migration cases in Odia newspaper (Sambad) since last two years, but I did not find any case where the local police caught illegal migrants. Those cases, where the illegal migrants are caught by officials, happens often symbolically and with the involvement of higher officialdom such as the district collector and SP. Some NGOs and activist groups are saying that, the police officer has to pay some money on yearly basis to their seniors to continue to have a posting in Police stations located in the Migrant labour recruitment areas, but I do not have any proof to establish this argument.

\textsuperscript{11} Three railway stations as Kantabanji, Muribahal, and Lathor of Balangir district are suitable for this labour migration work.
In these railway stations, the local youth group (an organized Mafia set up in the name of cricket clubs or other youth associations) helps the Second Sardar-cum-Makardam to ensure that the workers do not escape en-route up to Vijayawada or Vishakhapatnam in one train route and up to Raipur in another train route. For this work, the youth wings (organized Mafia) charges 30 – 50 rupees per person. Their work is mostly to catch workers if anybody tries to get-off the train in between, especially during the course of changing trains (it requires to change trains at least once in between Titilagarh to Vishakhapatnam in one route or at Raipur in another route). Secondly, if any Makardam does not pay these groups, they threaten the Makardam with registering complaints with the labour office and collector about the illegal migration. Then as the train crosses Orissa and enters Andhra Pradesh, there are groups of urban Mafia, they have specifically named Mafia groups in Vijayawada and have referred to a Mafia don called Bobbili town’s Babbulu. In Telangana region, as well there are local level Mafia that is operating as a monitoring agency (Senguptta and Vijay, 2015).

At both the station of origin and the destination railway stations the Makardam also pay bribes to the railway officials. This payment in general is 100 rupees per person. These bribe payments are extremely organized. Once payment is made to any one officer, no other officer asks for further payments; how they communicate and distribute this booty nobody knows. After reaching the destination railway station, the responsibility of the Makardam is to hand over the labourers to the owner’s people. The owner’s people, take them in a lorry from railway station to the brick kiln.

**Benefit of the Second Sardar**

The whole process of migration and before and after the migration, the second Sardar is a person visualized everywhere with the labourers. But the position of the Second Sardar differs with different situation. Before migration, the second Sardar is a helpful person for labourers. At the time of deciding advance payment, he acts as an agent of the Sardar. At the time of negotiation with village committee, Police and Railway Police, his position is representative of the Sardar. After reaching to the destination, brick kiln side, he works as a Makardam, agent of the Owner. For each role and set of functions he gets benefitted, but we cannot differentiate one from another as the whole process is interconnected. All the benefits are also not in direct monetary form rather some are in other forms of social value.

Foremost clear visible benefit is the commission income which is around 1000 per Pathri, so the average commission income per second Sardar is 35000 rupees (35 Pathari X 1000 rupees commission). And the second direct benefit for the second Sardar-cum-Makardam is the amount which he gets by working as a Makardam, mostly 30000 rupees for a season of work. There is some other economic benefit he gets but not directly rather by cheating to the police, and railway officer. The second Sardar pays 200 rupees per person to the police, so he charges it from his Sardar. But he cheats the police in number of labourer migrating under him and the police also never come to count the number of labourers migrating. In the survey, it is found that, this cheating is around 2/3 of actual migrant labourers. So, in my survey data, the total number of labourers migrate under a second Sardar is around 105 (35 Pathari X 3 members per
So the average income of Sardars by cheating to the police is around 7000 rupees (200 tips amount X 105 number of labourer X 1/3 cheating share). The second Sardar-cum Makardam in the same way cheats to the railway officer also. This is possible only because the railway officers do not able to enter inside the General bogey of the railway coaches. So from railway cheating, the second Sardar income is around 3500 rupees. The second Sardar is also not taking tickets for less than 14 years child, but they are included in labourer group, but he takes ticket cost of these child labourers from the Sardar. This indirect benefit to the second Sardar from the cheated railways ticket is not very clear, so I could not able to count it. Other direct benefits to the second Sardar-cum-Makardam in destination place are high weekly allowances and regular pament for drinks. The income from the brick kiln is contributing around 70 percent of second Sardar total income.

**Characteristic of a big Sardar**

Does the second Sardar evolve as big Sardar or who else? The study found three groups of people evolve as big Sardar. This group formed with respect to their past work, as one group from brick kiln work, second one from mafia group working in different train and third group are from local level politician with some Gunda. The evolving of each group have also some caste and religious as well as region specific. First group, those are evolve from brick kiln worker to big sardar stage, are mostly from the SC caste and located Belpada block and nearest place. Among these groups of Dalit, the person who first created a contact with the owner became a big Sardar. First big Sardar is due to first time mover benefit. Next big Saradar are the relative of old one.

Second group of big Sardar have developed from mafia group working in train. The sardar pays some fees (20-50 rupees) per worker to the Mafia leader to protect their labourer from other Mafia group and safely reach at destination railway station and handover to the owner. For this activity the Mafia group leader have relation with the Sardar, second Sardar and labourer at Odisha and owner at destination. This type of big Sardar mostly located in Lathor and also Kantabaji area. This region specificity is due to railway station and secondly these railway station are located more interior place, which help the Mafia group to get out.

Third group of second Sardar have evolved from local politician. The owner comes once or twice to the Odisha mostly to Kantabanji (small town of Balangir district) to make payment to the big Sardar. So, to protect from theft of cash, they required good contact with the local politician. The local political power are control by some Muslim and Sikh people. In this process some of the Muslim person of Kantabanji creates contact with the owner as well as sardar. Secondly as they protect the owner, it is very easy for them to own the trust of the owner.

So, the necessary condition is that the person should own the trust of the owner. This is possible for the Dalit second Sardar through the reference of a big Sardar and also for other group of Sardar. Sufficient condition to evolve as big sardar is to create some good second Sardar under him.

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13 Per general ticket cost from Balangir to Secunderabad is 270. If he able to cheat one ticket, than his income will be 270 rupees per worker ticket cheating.

14 For this argument, I don’t have data from the big Sardar. I know it from the second Sardar and some migrant work who worked as second sardar but fail to evolve as big sardar.
Risk in second Sardar activity-
The only risk that the second Sardar and Sardar have is stated to be the ‘cheating’ by labourers. In the chapter ‘Role of advance payment’, it is clearly explained the different process of cheating argument of owner but this study has falsified them logically and empirically from my survey data. The percentage of cheating is around 2.5%, which is so less as compared to the income of the Sardar and owner from the brick kiln work.

This stage wise mediating between the labourers and owner have two ideas behind it. Firstly, screening of workers, and Secondly, owner’s control over the labourers work. If the worker does not work harder than the owner punish the Sardar and second Sardar by declining his demand of labourers from them and by connecting the commission payment to the labourers work efficiency. So, the second Sardar forces the labourers to work hard. Otherwise, the labourers may be excluded from the credit market and other employment opportunity in their place of origin. The advance payment is decided within the interlock market system with prior information to the second Sardar and Sardar. This interlock system also partly forces the labourers for disciplined hard work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of second Sardar interviewed</th>
<th>Per head average no. of worker migrating</th>
<th>Per head average no. of worker cheated</th>
<th>per centag e of worker cheated</th>
<th>Total amount paid to cheated worker</th>
<th>Total advance amount paid by cheated worker</th>
<th>Total advance amount of cheated worker paid by second Sardar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.7 lakh</td>
<td>2.25 lakh</td>
<td>4.45 lakh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source- author’s primary survey in 2014

Impacts of local economic institutions on Advance payment decision process
This section has explained about the impact of institutional arrangement (labour contractor) on the worker current economic position (i.e, advance payment). The second Sardar knows the economic and social condition of labourers and helps 70 percent of the labourers to get a loan. So, on the one hand the second Sardar knows the emergency of money of the labourers and on the other hand, the labourers are interlocked with second Sardar as he acts as guarantor for their loan. Both the above causes i.e., emergency of money and interlocking of labourers are enough opportunity for second Sardars to decrease the bargaining capacity of workers in the advance payment decision process. Even most of the labourers have never argued with the Sardar to get more advance payment.

The study has tried to prove the impact institutional arrangement over the advance payment through the use of labour household’s data. This empirical part is mostly trying to explain the decision of advance payment process through dummy variable regression model. From the above discussion, we can concludes that the worker have required advance payment broadly two purpose as, emergency of money (either consumption or repayment of loan) and higher quality of work. If it is higher quality of work matter in advance payment decision, then the high experience family should get higher payment as they know the brick kiln work very well for long period. In emergency of money, we chose their food expenditure, nonfood expenditure and debt amount. And to check the institutional arrangement impact, we use a dummy variable as, second Sardar help in getting debt. Land holding an additional variable have used to see the advance payment decision. So in the dummy variable regression model, advance payment is
dependent variable and food expenditure, non-food expenditure, debt amount, brick kiln experience, land holding and second Sardar help to get loan are independent variable.

Excepted sign of variable coefficient, mostly the emergency of money as, food expenditure, non-food expenditure and debt amount and the dummy variable (second Sardar help to get loan) should have negative relation with the advance payment. Because the more emergency of money households are ready to migrate any advance payment. The second Sardar help to get loan is more about information sharing and interlocking of labour households, one way, the debt amount of the labourer is clearly know to the second Sardar (who act as an agent of sardar in advance payment decision process) and secondly the labourer are interlocking with second Sardar as he act as a guarantor in debt. Rest variable landholding and experience of brick kiln worker are expected to be positive relation with the advance payment. Because the more landholder have higher option of livelihood and bargain power and the more experience worker have more knowledge about brick kiln institutional system.

Per worker Advance = F (land holding, brick making experience, food exp., non-food exp., second

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Model-1</th>
<th>Model-2</th>
<th>Model-3</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>12381*</td>
<td>12874*</td>
<td>12858*</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land ownership</td>
<td>210.23</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>15.26</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Exp.</td>
<td>1.61*</td>
<td>1.64*</td>
<td>1.5*</td>
<td>2457</td>
<td>1120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-food Exp.</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td>26628</td>
<td>11768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Worker Debt</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4120</td>
<td>3824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Sardar Help</td>
<td>-1127.8*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>29-help</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt*Help</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.2*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R^2</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*** at 10% level significance, (**)—5% level significance, (*)-1% level significance.

The above model do not have multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity problem, which is checked through the VIF (variance influence factor) and Bruesch-Pagan heteroscedasticity test. From the F-statistics, we also concluded that the model are statistically significance. The adjusted R^2 are more than 25%, which is well accepted in cross section regression model.

In above three model, land ownership of the households and experience of the worker are insignificant impact over advance payment amount, but the emergency of money and institutional arrangement variable have significance impact over advance payment. The second Sardar help to get private loan for the worker and per worker debt amount variable are individually significance in model-1 and model-2 respectively. In model-3 check the combine effect of second Sardar help to get loan and debt amount, so, the model use multiplication of both variable, which is also significance. So, the second Sardar help and debt amount have individually as well as combined effect on advance payment decision process and the combine effect is also more than their respective individual effect.

Except food expenditure coefficient sign, all other variable coefficient have expected sign. The food expenditure has positive sign, which means the advance payment amount increases with increasing food expenditure of the households. It may be due to the minimum requirement
expenditure effect on advance payment. The nonfood expenditure and debt amount have negative effect on advance payment amount. It clear that the household with higher nonfood as health, festival and gift or marriage expenditure are getting less amount of advance payment then the less nonfood expenditure households. The per worker debt amount has also negative sign as expected from the theoretical idea of advance payment decision.

The debt amount represent the worker emergency of money in lump sum, as they have needed to repay principal as well as 10% per month interest at a time. So the worker required money at any cost, which is golden opportunity for second Sardar and Sardar to decrease the advance payment. The second Sardar help to get loan has also negative sign as expected in our modeling. It explain that among the migrant borrowing households, the second Sardar help in getting loan households are worse than non-helping households. It is also much visible in the data that the money lender are providing big amount of loan (mostly more than 10000 rupees) to the borrower either through their linkage or second Sardar guarantor. As the second Sardar act as a gurentor in his loan, the worker is now interlock with the second Sardar. And he does not have any other option then migration to repay their debt, where the whole advance amount is fully decided by the Sardar.

So, the poor labourer households required debt to maintain their consumption expenditure, and to repay their debt with high interest rate they bund to take less advance payment and migrate to brick kiln for the period of seven month (November to end of May). Due to the less advance payment they not able to generate surplus, os, they again required loan to maintain their consumption expenditure in origin place and this cycle continue over four decades in western Odisha.

More debt trap households=> less bargain power in advance payment decision=> less advance payment=> no surplus=> again loan for consumption expenditure=> again entire to debt trap=>migration with less advance payment=> circulation is continue.

**Conclusion**
In politically, all Sardar are controlling local politics, as they able to monitored votes of their migrant worker in the name of employment and other benefits. In socially, bigger part of social conflict is managed by the village committee and their religious activity, to whom the Sardar are paying money according to number of migrant worker. The village elites are ignoring the migration as they have benefited from the moneylending activities, which is expanded and decreased risk of repayment due to mediation of second Sardar.

In economic issue, each institution, start from second Sardar to the railway mafia and village elites are economical well of due to the migration process. The srada group allways try to decreased the advance amount of the labourer not only due to their economic gain but also it helps the migration process to sustain. The Sardar allways try that the labourer should not generates surplus from the migration or advance payment. So, that they required debt for their consumption in next season, which force them to take advance to repay their debt and the migration will continue. The poor household with more debt and that debt with the help of second Sardar has losed their bargain power in advance payment decision. So, they get less
advance payment and no surplus from brick kiln work. Now again they required debt for their consumption purpose and entered into the cycle of migration.

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